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Accounting Conservatism and Firm Investment Efficiency 
 
Abstract 
Conservatism, through the timelier recognition of losses in the income statement, is expected to 
increase firm investment efficiency through three main channels: (1) by decreasing the adverse 
effect of information asymmetries between outside equity holders and managers, facilitating the 
monitoring of managerial investment decisions; (2) by increasing managerial incentives to 
abandon poorly performing projects earlier and to undertake fewer negative net present-value 
investments; and (3) by facilitating the access to external financing at lower cost. Using a large 
US sample for the period 1990-2007 we find a negative association between conservatism and 
measures of over- and under- investment, and a positive association between conservatism and 
future profitability. This is consistent with firms reporting more conservative numbers investing 
more efficiently and in more profitable projects. Our results add to a growing stream of literature 
suggesting that eliminating conservatism from accounting regulatory frameworks may lead to 
undesirable economic consequences. 
 
Keywords:  Conservatism, earnings asymmetric timeliness, investment efficiency, 
overinvestment, underinvestment 
Data Availability: Data is available from the sources identified in the paper. 
JEL Classification:  G10, G31, M41. 
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1. Introduction 
In the joint FASB and IASB conceptual framework project, conservatism is not considered a 
desirable qualitative characteristic of accounting information (FASB, 2008). This decision has 
fueled the stream of research on the economic effects of conservative accounting and raised 
interest on the possible costs of eliminating conservatism. Recent studies highlight the 
informational benefits of conservatism, which is expected to reduce information asymmetry 
problems (LaFond and Watts, 2008), leading to lower earnings management (Chen et al., 2007) 
and lower cost of capital (Suijs, 2008). Firm commitment to conservative reporting leads to full 
disclosure (Guay and Verrecchia, 2007), facilitating managerial monitoring, as no information is 
withheld. In turn, closer monitoring is expected to improve capital allocation decisions 
(Bushman and Smith 2001, Bushman et al., 2007; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007a). However, 
critical voices claim that full disclosure leads to inefficiencies in corporate governance. Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2008) show that, under full disclosure, managers have incentives to deviate from 
optimal decision making (i.e. inefficient risk-taking in investments), due to career concerns. 
In this paper, we try to shed light on the debate of the effects of increased monitoring on 
firms’ investment policies by studying the association between accounting conservatism and firm 
investment efficiency. Following Basu (1997), conservatism is defined as the more stringent 
verifiability requirements for the recognition of gains relative to losses into accounting earnings.1 
This asymmetry results in earnings that reflect bad news (difficult-to-verify economic losses) 
faster than good news (difficult-to-verify economic gains). Conservatism can then be interpreted 
                                                 
1
 As developed in Beaver and Ryan (2005) there are two types of conservatism: conditional or news related and 
unconditional or news unrelated. Khan and Watts (2009) refer to the first one as conservatism flow. They argue that 
this conservatism flow builds up a cumulative understatement of net assets: conservatism stock. In this paper, we 
focus on the consequences of increased conditional or flow conservatism.. 
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as a commitment by management to reflect low (bad) realizations of economic events in the 
financial statements in a timelier manner (Guay and Verrecchia, 2007). 
We hypothesize that conservatism has a significant informational role that results in 
improvements to firm investment efficiency. In particular, we expect conservatism influences 
firm investment efficiency in three main ways. First, recent research demonstrates that 
conservatism appears as a reaction to information asymmetries (LaFond and Watts, 2008; Khan 
and Watts, 2009). Conservatism reduces the adverse effects of existing asymmetries between 
managers and outside investors by restricting managerial accounting manipulation and 
permitting other sources of information to flourish (LaFond and Watts, 2008). Therefore, 
increased conservatism ameliorates information asymmetry problems and contributes to facilitate 
the ex post monitoring process over managerial investment decisions. This is consistent with the 
evidence in Ahmed and Duellman (2007b) and Garcia Lara et al. (2009) that conditional 
conservatism is associated to the existence of stronger corporate governance mechanisms that 
decrease the power of the CEO and improve monitoring. 
Second, by requiring early recognition of poor realizations, accounting conservatism 
plays a significant role in resolving managerial agency conflicts. As argued by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), because losses have to be recognised in a timely manner, managers are 
aware that they will not be able to defer the earnings consequences of their investment decisions 
to the next generation of managers; i.e., managers have to bear the consequences of their 
decisions during their tenure. This is predicted to limit managerial investments in ex ante 
negative net present value (NPV) projects, reducing the likelihood of managers engaging in 
empire building strategies, ‘pet’ projects or ‘trophy’ acquisitions. Similarly, conservatism is 
predicted to trigger the early abandonment of ex post poorly performing projects and deter 
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strategies of continuing (over) investment in under performing projects. Under conservative 
reporting, because loss recognition cannot be deferred, managers opt to abandon negative NPV 
projects earlier. Therefore, timely loss recognition is expected to increase managerial incentives 
to react quickly to negative realizations, limiting losses on projects that do not perform. 
Finally, firm conservatism is predicted to facilitate attracting external funding at lower 
cost. Conservative accounting mitigates bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividends and 
lowers cost of debt financing (Ahmed et al., 2002; Zhang, 2008), which permits access to less 
risky debt and therefore, reduces debt overhang negative effects on investment efficiency 
(Myers, 1977; 1984). Conservatism is also expected to decrease cost of equity capital (Guay and 
Verrecchia, 2007; Suijs, 2008). These decreases in cost of debt and cost of equity capital are 
expected to facilitate financing investment opportunities that otherwise might not be pursued 
because of lack of funding or because the costs associated to accessing the funding outweigh the 
benefits of undertaking the projects. 
All these effects should lead to a positive association between conservatism and 
investment efficiency. Recent empirical work by Bushman et al. (2007) and Ahmed and 
Duellman (2007a) provide some initial evidence on the association between conservatism and 
investment efficiency. Bushman et al. (2007) show that investment efficiency varies 
internationally with aggregate conservatism at the country-level, while Ahmed and Duellman 
(2007a) study the relation between conservatism and future outcomes of firms’ investment 
policies. In a related line of research, work by Jackson (2008) and Jackson et al. (2009) shows 
that firm depreciation method is associated to managerial capital investment decisions. In 
particular, they provide evidence that firms that use accelerated depreciation (which could be 
interpreted as a form of balance-sheet conservatism) make significantly larger capital 
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investments than firms that use straight-line depreciation. This evidence is consistent with 
conservative accounting treatments affecting investment decisions, but silent on whether this 
increased investment is efficient. In this paper, we more directly address the issue of whether 
more conservative firms invest more efficiently by analyzing if conservative accounting 
constrains managerial tendencies to under- and over-invest. 
We study the association between conditional conservatism and investment efficiency 
using a large US sample of 41,851 firm-year observations for the period 1990-2007. We follow 
the methodology in Biddle et al. (2009) and analyse the association between investment 
efficiency and a proxy of firm-level conservative reporting CONS, which is based on the work of 
Khan and Watts (2009). In our tests, we also incorporate the measure of accrual quality in Biddle 
et al. (2009) to ensure that we isolate the economic consequences of conservatism. In particular, 
we study if more conservative firms show lower capital over- and under-investment. The 
analysis yields three key findings. First, we find that conservatism enhances investment 
efficiency by contributing to reduce both over- and under-investment. Specifically, firms with 
higher conservatism invest less (more) in years when there are signs of over- (under-) investment 
in the whole economy, the industry of reference and at the firm-specific level. The results are 
robust to the inclusion of multiple control variables and to the use of alternative measures of 
investment. Second, we find that conservatism decreases investment among firms with free cash 
flow problems, and increases investment amongst those that face financing constraints, as 
measured by high leverage. Overall, these results are consistent with conservatism reducing 
under-investment by facilitating access to external funding. We also show that more 
conditionally conservative firms are less likely both to over- and under- invest relative to their 
optimal levels of investment. Our evidence thus discards the possibility that, in line with the 
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arguments in Hermalin and Weisbach (2008), in firms committed to more transparent financial 
reporting and increased conservatism, managers have greater career concerns (in terms of job 
stability and reputation costs) and deviate from optimal investment to secure their jobs. In our 
final set of tests, we analyze the association between conservatism and future investment 
performance. To the extent that conservative firms invest more efficiently, we should observe 
superior future investment performance for these firms. Using measures of future firm stock 
returns and gross profit margins, we find evidence of superior investment performance in firms 
that are more conservative. 
Our results add to the recent stream of empirical literature on the effects of higher quality 
reporting over investment efficiency (Biddle and Hilary, 2006; McNichols and Stubben, 2008; 
Biddle et al. 2009), and particularly, on how conservative accounting choices affect firms’ 
investment decisions (Bushman et al. 2007, Ahmed and Duellman 2007a), by limiting under-
investment and facilitating firm access to external financing. We show that conservatism is 
associated to investment efficiency as a distinctive qualitative characteristic of accounting, 
different and beyond Biddle’s et al (2009) accruals quality measure. Our findings suggest that 
firm commitment to conservatism can lead to a direct benefit to investors in the form of more 
efficient investments.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the expected association 
between investment efficiency and conservatism. Section 3 contains the research design and the 
description of the sample. Section 4 discusses the main results and robustness checks, and 
finally, section 5 concludes. 
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2. Conservatism in accounting and investment efficiency 
An efficient investment policy can be defined as one in which all positive NPV investment 
projects are identified, funded and implemented, while all negative NPV projects are rejected 
(Julio 2007). Agency theory predicts that whilst managers may be well informed about the 
existence of profitable investment opportunities, they might not always pursue them because of 
(1) moral hazard problems that derive in managerial expropriation of firm cash flows, myopic 
biases and inefficient selection of investment opportunities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 
1986; Stein, 1989); and (2) lack of available funding derived from high cost of external 
financing. This high cost of equity capital can be due to the firm capital structure, which might 
drive a wedge between the overall return to investment and the return accrued to shareholders; 
but it can also be partly attributable to information asymmetries and complications in the 
estimation of the firm’s future cash flows. 
Accounting information plays an important role in monitoring senior managers (Bushman 
and Smith, 2001), contributing to ameliorate moral hazard problems and to decrease the 
problems created by information asymmetries, and, as shown by Lambert et al. (2007) it 
facilitates the estimation of firms’ future cash flows. As suggested by Bushman and Smith 
(2001) and Lambert et al. (2007), these effects are expected to increase firm value by improving 
firm’s investment decisions. Empirical research by Biddle and Hilary (2006), McNichols and 
Stubben (2008), Biddle et al. (2009) and Hope and Thomas (2008) confirms that the quality of 
accounting information and disclosure affects investment efficiency. In particular, Biddle and 
Hillary (2006) document a positive association at the country- and firm-levels between 
investment-cash flow sensitivity and information opacity. In a similar vein, Schleicher et al. 
(2008) show that IFRS adoption in Europe contributes to lower investment cash-flow sensitivity, 
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Biddle et al. (2009) find that increased accruals quality is associated to lower over- and under-
investment and McNichols and Stubben (2008) show that firms that manipulate their reported 
earnings make suboptimal investment decisions during the misreporting period. Finally, Hope 
and Thomas (2008) demonstrate that not disclosing geographic segment information has a 
negative effect on the efficiency of foreign investment. 
In this study, we add to this literature by focusing on the association between investment 
efficiency and accounting conservatism. Prior research shows that timely recognition of 
economic losses (i) appears as a reaction to the existence of information asymmetries (LaFond 
and Watts, 2008; Khan and Watts, 2009), (ii) facilitates the monitoring of CEO decisions 
(Beekes et al., 2004; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007b; Garcia Lara et al., 2009), and (iii) decreases 
the cost of debt and equity capital (Ahmed et al., 2002; Guay and Verrecchia, 2007; Suijs, 2008). 
These effects are predicted to jointly improve investment efficiency.  
2.1. The link between conservatism and investment efficiency 
Prior literature on the association between conditional conservatism and investment efficiency is 
scarce, and has looked at the issue in a relatively indirect way. In particular, Bushman et al. 
(2007) provide evidence consistent with a negative relation between country-level measures of 
investment cash flow sensitivity and country-level measures of conditional conservatism. From a 
different methodological perspective, Ahmed and Duellman (2007a) find evidence that more 
conditionally conservative firms present higher future profitability measures like gross profit 
margins and cash flows, and less special item charges. They interpret this evidence as indicative 
of more conditionally conservative firms investing more efficiently. 
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Conditional conservatism, through the timelier recognition of economic losses in the 
income statement, is predicted to increase firm investment efficiency through three main 
channels: (1) by decreasing the negative effects of information asymmetries and facilitating the 
monitoring of managerial investment decisions; (2) by increasing managerial incentives to 
abandon poorly performing projects earlier and to undertake fewer negative net present-value 
investments; and (3) by facilitating access to external financing at lower cost. In this section, we 
explain each of these channels in detail. 
2.1.1. Conservatism, information asymmetry and increased monitoring 
In the presence of information asymmetries, managers may make suboptimal investment choices, 
for example, in an attempt to manipulate market’s inferences about firm prospects (Bizjak et al. 
1993). Recent work by LaFond and Watts (2008) demonstrates that conditional conservatism 
appears as a reaction to the existence of information asymmetries. Conditional conservatism 
serves to reduce the negative effects of existing asymmetries among the different parties to the 
firm by resolving agency conflicts and allowing other sources of information to flourish. 
Conditional conservatism also reduces the opportunities for successful earnings management, 
imposing greater costs on managers that wish to manipulate accounting earnings (Guay and 
Verrecchia 2006). As shown in McNichols and Stubben (2008), earnings management serves to 
mask underlying trends in revenue and earnings growth that are important in forming 
expectations of investment benefits. Thus, we expect that increased conditional conservatism 
ameliorates information asymmetry problems. This, in turn, facilitates the ex post monitoring of 
managerial investment decisions.  
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Conservatism deters artificial inflation of earnings available for distribution to 
shareholders at the expense of lenders, and limits the ability to overstate earnings and be over-
compensated under accounting-based compensation plans. Khan and Watts (2009) argue that 
these restrictions reduce agency costs, because they discourage managerial efforts to transfer 
wealth to themselves instead of increasing the total firm wealth. 
This monitoring role of conditional conservatism helps boards of directors and other 
governance mechanisms to detect and deter managerial sub-optimal behaviour. Conditional 
conservatism provides early warning signals to these governance bodies, which permits imposing 
limits to managerial control rights in a timely manner (Ahmed and Duellman 2007b, García Lara 
et al. 2009). Awareness of these constraints deters management from attempting to expropriate 
firm cash flows from shareholders and other parties to the firm by engaging in value reducing 
strategies such as empire building or investment in ‘pet’ projects and ‘trophy’ acquisitions. 
Consistent with this idea, Richardson (2006) demonstrates that the monitoring exerted by certain 
governance mechanisms can reduce firm over-investment of free cash flows. 
Conservatism also facilitates the selection of ex ante positive NPV projects and reduces 
the probability that bad projects will be pursued, even in the absence of moral hazard problems. 
Analyzing investment decisions in a real options framework, Smith (2007) analytically illustrates 
that an accounting system biased towards conservatism avoids classifying bad investment 
projects as good, thus limiting investment in ex ante bad projects. 
2.1.2. Conservatism and constraints to shift investment losses across periods 
Related to our prior argument on the association between conservatism and decreased 
information asymmetries and increased monitoring, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that 
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timely incorporation of bad realizations into accounting income implies that managers will not 
be able to defer the recognition of losses to the next generation of managers. Myopic investment 
behavior is a particularly pervasive problem whenever the manager is likely to leave the firm 
prior to the ultimate release of information to the market. Conservatism, by requiring early 
recognition of economic losses, is predicted to create incentives for managers to act quickly in 
the presence of poorly performing projects, discouraging further investments on bad projects and 
limiting myopic biases. In line with this prediction, recent research by Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) 
shows that loss reporting serves to resolve agency problems and acts as a trigger to divest 
unproductive investments. Pinnuck and Lillis argue that reporting accounting losses triggers the 
exercise of the abandonment option and divest factors, divisions and projects that represent 
negative NPV investments. Thus, loss reporting has a clear agency role. Firm commitment to 
timely loss recognition is predicted to trigger early divestment of ex post unproductive 
investments, before they accumulate into losses on abandonment or sale. 
2.1.3. Conservatism and access to external financing 
In their seminal work, Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that financing and investment 
decisions are completely separate in perfect capital markets. However, an ample theoretical 
literature has subsequently shown that various frictions drive linkages between financing and 
investment decisions (see, e.g., Myers 1977, Childs et al., 2005). Whilst accounting policies do 
not affect the level of internal cash flows, we expect that one way in which conditional 
conservatism affects investment decisions is by facilitating firm access to external funds and, 
particularly, to debt financing.  
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In the accounting and finance literature, there is an ongoing debate on whether and how 
accounting information can affect firm cost of capital. Using different analytical models, Easley 
and O’Hara (2004) and Lambert et al. (2007, 2008) demonstrate that high quality accounting 
information and disclosure can reduce firm cost of capital. Guay and Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs 
(2008) contribute to this debate by analytically demonstrating that increased conditional 
conservatism results in lower cost of capital. Specifically, Guay and Verrecchia (2007) argue that 
a commitment to timely loss recognition results in full disclosure of information, reducing the 
discount markets apply to firm value in the presence of uncertainty. Suijs (2008) demonstrates 
that conditional conservatism lowers cost of capital by reducing price volatility.2  
Conservatism is also expected to lower the cost of debt financing. Ahmed et al (2002) 
hypothesize and find evidence consistent with conservatism attenuating shareholder-bondholder 
conflicts over dividends. In the presence of more conservative accounting, bondholders are likely 
to accept a lower rate of return in light of the reduced risk of dividend overpayment to 
shareholders. By choosing conservative accounting methods, managers can negotiate more 
favorable debt terms and covenants, and likely they can also renegotiate the terms of debt to 
resolve conflicts between security holders and bondholders in order to allow for more efficient 
investment choices.3 In a recent study, Zhang (2008) shows empirically that conditional 
conservatism benefits lenders through timely signaling of default risks and benefits borrowers in 
obtaining lower interest rates. 
                                                 
2
 Empirical findings on the association between cost of capital and other earnings attributes, such as a accruals 
quality and income smoothing are somewhat mixed (see, e.g., Francis et al., 2004, 2005; Core et al., 2008; McInnis 
2008). 
3
 According to Julio (2007), renegotiation usually results in reductions in principal or interest, extensions of debt 
maturity, changes in covenants, or debt-for-equity exchanges. 
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Therefore, we expect that conservative accounting will permit access to funding at a 
lower cost of capital (debt and equity). We expect that this lowering in financing costs will 
contribute to improve investment efficiency by facilitating access to capital funds to finance 
positive NPV projects that the firm would not have pursued had financing costs been higher. 
Especially for cash-constraint and highly leveraged firms we expect conditional conservatism to 
contribute to reduce under-investment. 
To sum up, we hypothesize that conservative accounting increases investment efficiency 
both by lowering managerial selection of ex ante negative NPV projects and by triggering early 
abandonment of ex post poorly performing ones (thereby reducing over-investment). 
Additionally, conservatism is expected to increase investment efficiency by facilitating firm 
access to external financing and lowering the cost of raising funds for new investments, which 
facilitates investment in positive NPV projects (thereby reducing under-investment). 
 
3. Research design 
In this section, we first present the models used to test the association between conservatism and 
firm investment efficiency. In particular, we use three different specifications based on the work 
of Biddle et al. (2009). Then, we present and validate the proxy used to measure conservatism at 
the firm-year level. Finally, we describe the sample used to test our predictions. 
3.1. Association between conservatism and investment efficiency 
As argued in Biddle et al. (2009), measures of investment-cash flow sensitivities can reflect 
either financing constraints or an excess of cash. Our tests are thus based on the measurement 
proposed by Biddle et al. (2009), which permits analyzing the effects of accounting choices in 
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reducing over- and under-investment, as well as the net effect. We adapt their model to capture 
the effects of conditional conservatism on investment efficiency as follows: 
Investmentt+1 = αi + βi + δ1 CONSt + δ2 CONSt*OverInvt+1 + δ3 FRQt  
  + δ4 FRQt*OverInvt+1 + δ5 OverInvt+1 + γ Controlst + µ t+1         (1) 
where Investment is a measure of future investment in both capital and non-capital goods, CONS 
is a firm-year-specific measure of conservatism, increasing in conservatism, OverInv is a ranked 
variable capturing settings where over- or under-investment is more likely, FRQ is one of the 
two different measures used in Biddle et al. (2009) to capture accruals quality, and Controls is a 
vector of control variables that affect the level of investment and conservatism. These control 
variables will be defined in more detail in the following sections. We estimate equation (1) in a 
panel-data fashion with a fixed effect model that includes firm and year indicator variables to 
control for year- and firm-specific shocks to investment.  
Similar to Biddle et al. (2009), our investment proxy, Investment, is a measure of total 
investment defined as capital expenditures plus research and development plus acquisition 
expenditures less cash receipts from sales of property plant and equipment, multiplied by 100 
and scaled by average total assets. In our robustness tests we also measure investment as capital 
expenditures scaled by lagged property plant and equipment. OverInv takes values between 0 
and 1, where 0 (or values close to 0) indicates under-investment and 1 (or values close to 1) 
indicates over-investment. In the above regression (model 1) the coefficients of interest are δ1 
and δ2. Our main hypothesis is that conditional conservatism improves investment efficiency; 
that is, conservatism reduces both under- and over-investment. Therefore, when under-
investment is present (i.e., OverInv = 0) we expect coefficient δ1 to be positive. A positive δ1 
indicates that conditional conservatism increases capital investment in settings where under-
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investment is most likely. On the contrary, when over-investment is present (i.e., OverInv = 1) 
we expect coefficient δ2 to be negative and greater in absolute value than δ1 (i.e., δ1 + δ2 < 0), 
indicating that conservatism decreases investment in settings where over-investment is most 
likely. 
Clearly, the key element in model (1) is the definition of OverInv: our proxy to detect 
settings in which there is under- or over-investment. Following Biddle et al. (2009), we define 
OverInv in three different ways. First, we measure OverInv at the aggregate economy-wide level 
to identify years in which there is average under- or over-investment at the economy level. We 
refer to this proxy as OverAggregate, and it is defined as the decile ranks of the residuals from a 
time-series regression of annual average future capital expenditures on annual average current 
sales growth. This regression is estimated in time-series fashion as follows: 
Investmentt+1 = β0 + β1 SalesGrowtht + µ t+1   t = 1975, … 2007         (2) 
where Investment is the average future investment for each sample year, and SalesGrowth is a 
proxy of firm investment opportunities calculated as the average change in sales from year t-1 to 
t for each sample year. To obtain OverAggregate at the aggregate economy-wide level, we rank 
the residuals of regression (2) into deciles and rescale the ranks from 0 to 1 to facilitate the 
interpretation of the coefficients of regression (1). Finally, we assign this annual measure to each 
firm based on its year. Thus, sample years with large positive (negative) residuals will be 
considered as years of average over-investment (under-investment) at the economy-wide level, 
and they will have values of OverAggregate close to 1 (0). As explained later, our sample covers 
the period 1990-2007. However, in the estimation of equation (2) we use observations starting in 
year 1975. We do so to increase the number of annual observations to 32 in order to better 
calibrate equation (2). 
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Second, we measure OverInv at the industry-year level and we refer to this proxy as 
OverIndustry. To do so, we estimate regression (2) at the industry-year level. Using the 48 
industry groups detailed in Fama and French (1997) we obtain the annual average of Investment 
and SalesGrowth for each industry-year group. We impose a minimum of 20 observations per 
industry in any given year. Then, we follow the procedure detailed above. We estimate 
regression (2) and rank the residuals into deciles, and rescale the decile rankings from 0 to 1. 
Finally, we assign to each firm-year observation its corresponding industry-year ranking. High 
(low) values of OverIndustry identify settings in which over-investment (under-investment) at 
the industry-year level is most likely.  
Third, we measure OverInv at the firm-year level and refer to this proxy as OverFirm. 
Specifically, for each industry and year group, we estimate regression (2) at the firm-year level 
and rank the firm-specific residuals residuals into deciles. Finally, we rescale the decile rankings 
from 0 to 1. High (low) values of OverFirm identify settings in which over-investment (under-
investment) at the firm-year level is most likely. 
In summary, we construct OverInv in three different ways: at the economy-wide level 
identifying years in which over-investment is most likely in the whole economy, at the industry 
level identifying industry-years in which over-investment is most likely, and at the firm level 
identifying firm-years in which over-investment is most likely. In robustness tests we also 
measure OverInv at the firm level identifying circumstances in which firms have strong 
incentives to over-invest, measuring this type of incentive as combination of high free cash flow 
and low leverage. We refer to this incentive as HighFCF. 
The model described in regression (1) includes controls for effects that could confound 
the findings by driving either investment efficiency or conservatism. Following Biddle et al. 
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(2009), we control first of all for accrual quality (FRQ) and corporate governance characteristics. 
We also control for information asymmetry, idiosyncratic volatility, firm size, the market-to-
book ratio, depreciation method, volatility of cash flow from operations (CFO), volatility of 
sales, volatility of capital expenditures, bankruptcy risk, tangibility, capital structure, industry 
capital structure, CFO to sales ratio, financial slack, and dividend payout ratio. We also 
incorporate controls for age of the firm, length of the operating cycle, lengh of the investment 
cycle, and frequency of losses, as these may influence the accruals generating process and, 
therefore, our measure of conservatism (CONS).  
Regarding the financial reporting quality measure (FRQ in model 2 above), we use two 
proxies used in Biddle et al. (2009): AQ and AQW. AQ is the measure of accruals quality 
developed by Dechow and Dichew (2002) and modified by Francis et al. (2005). AQW is the 
measure of accruals quality developed by Wysocki (2008) and modified by Biddle et al. (2009). 
Higher values of AQ and AQW indicate higher accruals quality. In terms of the corporate 
governance variables, we incorporate a measure of the level of institutional holding (Inst-
holdings), measured as the percentage of firm shares held by institutional investors. We also 
control for the number of analysts following the firm (Analysts), and the quality of external 
corporate governance, using InvG-Score, the measure of anti-takeover protection developed by 
Gompers et al. (2003), multiplied by negative one, so that InvG-Score is increasing in corporate 
governance quality. Because G-Score is only available for a limited number of firms, whenever 
G-Score is missing, InvG-Score is assigned the value of zero. G-Score-dum is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if G-Score is missing, and zero otherwise. 
Regarding the control variables, we define information asymmetry (BAS) as the bid-ask-
spread, measured as the annual average of daily spread scaled by the midpoint between bid and 
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ask. Idiosyncratic volatility (Volatility) is the standard deviation of one year of daily stock 
returns. Firm size (Size) is measured as the log of market value of equity.The market-to-book 
ratio (MTB) is the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of total assets.4 
Depreciation method (AccDep) is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm uses 
accelerated depreciation, and zero otherwise. Recent work by Jackson et al. (2009) suggests 
firms that use accelerated depreciation have larger capital investments. Volatility of cash flow 
from operations (StdCFO) is the firm-specific standard deviation of the cash flow from 
operations scaled by average total assets, measured in the five-year period ending in the previous 
fiscal year (t-5 to t-1). Volatility of sales (StdSales) is the firm-specific standard deviation of 
annual sales deflated by average total assets, for years t-5 to t-1. Volatility of investment 
(StdInvestment) is the firm-specific standard deviation of annual Investment for years t-5 to t-1. 
Z-Score is the measure of bankruptcy risk defined in Biddle and Hilary (2006) and calculated 
with the following Compustat data items: Z-Score = [3.3*data170 + data12 + 0.25*data36 + 
0.5*(data4–data5)]/data6. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets. 
Capital structure (Leverage) is ratio of short-term plus long-term debt scaled by market value of 
equity. Industry capital structure (Ind Cap-struc) is the mean is the mean of capital structure for 
firms in the same SIC-3 digit industry, where capital structure is the ratio of long-term debt to the 
sum of long-term debt and market value of equity. CFO to sales (CFOsale) is the ratio of CFO to 
sales. Financial slack (Slack) is the ratio of cash to property, plant and equipment. Dividend 
payout ratio (Dividend) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm paid a dividend; 
0 otherwise. Age is the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the 
                                                 
4
 MTB, in addition to being a control variable for growth opportunities and rents which affect the level of 
investment, is also a control for past cumulative conservatism. 
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current year. Length of the operating cycle (OperCycle) is the log of receivables to sales plus 
inventory to COGS multiplied by 360. Length of the investment cycle (InvCycle) is a decreasing 
measure of the length of the investment cycle defined as depreciation expense scaled by lagged 
total assets. The frequency of losses (Loss) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if net 
income before extraordinary items is negative; 0 otherwise. Finally, we include firm- and year- 
fixed effects to control for firm- and year- specific shocks to investment.  
3.2. Conservatism and deviations from optimal investment  
As an additional test of the association between conservatism and investment efficiency, we 
model the probability that a firm will deviate from its optimal level of investment, conditional on 
its level of conservatism. To do so, we first estimate a firm-specific model of investment as a 
function of growth opportunities using model (2). The residuals from model (2) can be 
interpreted as a measure of firm-specific deviation from optimal levels of investment. We use the 
residuals from this model to classify firms into two groups. Specifically, we sort firms annually 
into quintiles based on the firm-specific residuals. Firm-year observations in the top or bottom 
quintile are classified as over- or under-investing, whilst those in the middle three quintiles are 
considered to be near their optimal level of investment and are used as a benchmark group. 
Using these data, we estimate a multinomial logit model that predicts the likelihood that a firm 
will deviate from its level of optimal investment (i.e., be on one of the extreme quintiles as 
opposed to being in the middle quartiles) as follows: 
Prob(ExtremeInvt+1=j) = αi + βi + δ1 CONSt + γ Controlst            (3) 
where j takes the value of 1 if the firm is classified as under-investing (Under); 2 if it belongs to 
the benchmark group; and 3 if it is classified as over-investing (Over). The main coefficient of 
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interest in model (3) is δ1. If conservatism deters firms from over- and under- investing, δ1 is 
expected to be significantly negative, indicating that more conservative firms are less likely to 
invest away from their optimal levels, and thus, they will be less likely to be in the top and 
bottom quintiles. The set of explanatory and control variables are the same we use in estimating 
model (1). As before, model (3) incorporates firm- and year- fixed effects. 
3.3. Performance effects of conservatism 
As previously discussed, the monitoring role of conservatism helps boards of directors and other 
governance bodies to deter value destroying strategies such as ‘empire building’, investment in 
‘pet’ projects or ‘trophy’ acquisitions. Therefore, it is likely that the primary effect of 
conservatism is to reduce over-investment. This higher investment efficiency implies future 
improvements in firm profitability because among the set of possible projects, firms will choose 
first those with higher NPV. Consequently, given that conservatism is hypothesized to improve 
investment efficiency, we expect to observe a positive association between present and past 
accounting conservatism and future investment performance. Consistent with this idea, Ahmed 
and Duellman (2007a) find a positive association between conservatism and firm gross profit 
margins and cash flows. To analyze the effect of conditional conservatism on future investment 
performance we employ these authors’ research design and estimate the following model: 
FutPerf = αi + βi + δ1 CONS + γ Controls  + µ            (4) 
where FutPerf is, alternatively, the three-year average of annual stock returns for years t+1 to 
t+3, or the three-year average of future gross profit margin (for years t+1 to t+3). We use gross 
profit margin, instead of other accounting-based measures of profitability, to reduce the 
likelihood of a possible mechanical link with conservatism. If firm accounting conservatism 
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improves investment efficiency, this improvement should translate into future increases in 
profitability. Consequently, we expect δ1 in equation (4) to be significantly positive. We use the 
same control variables as before. Model (4) is run incorporating alternatively both measures of 
FRQ, similar to Biddle et al. (2009), to ensure that CONS does not partially reflect accruals 
quality (AQ and AQW). 
3.4. Measure of conservatism 
To estimate models (1), (3) and (4) we need a firm-specific measure of conservatism (CONS). 
To construct this proxy, we follow the work of Khan and Watts (2009), who estimate a measure 
of firm-year measure of conservatism drawing from the Basu (1997) model. Prior literature 
demonstrates that the Basu (1997) model is able to capture cross-sectional variation in 
conditional conservatism.5 The model is as follows: 
Earni = β0 + β1 Negi + β2 Reti + β3 Reti*Negi + µ i             (5) 
where Earn is net income before extraordinary items deflated by market value of equity at the 
beginning of the period, Ret is the annual stock rate of return of the firm, measured compounding 
twelve monthly CRSP stock returns ending at fiscal year end, Neg is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 in the case of bad news (negative or zero stock rate of return) and 0 in the case of good 
news (positive stock rate of return) and i indexes the firm. In model (5), the β2 coefficient is the 
good news timeliness measure, β3 captures the incremental timeliness of earnings to bad news, 
and the total bad news timeliness is β2 + β3. Under conservative accounting, β3 is predicted to be 
                                                 
5
 See Ball and Kothari (2007) for a validation of the Basu (1997) model and for a summary of prior research using 
the model. However, other authors cast some doubts on the validity of inferences based on the Basu asymmetric 
timeliness coefficient (Givoly et al., 2007; Dietrich et al., 2007). 
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positive and significant. Larger β3 coefficients indicate more pronounced conditional 
conservatism.  
To estimate the timeliness with which accounting reflects bad news at the firm-year level, 
Khan and Watts (2009) specify that both firm annual conservatism (CONS) and the timeliness of 
good news (GNews) are a linear function of firm-specific characteristics each year: 
CONS = β3 = λ1 + λ2 Sizei + λ3 MBi + λ4 Levi           (6a) 
GNews= β2 = η1 + η2 Sizei + η3 MBi + η4 Levi           (6b) 
The empirical estimators of λi and ηi, i=1-4, are constant across firms, but vary over time as they 
are estimated from annual cross-sectional regressions. Using this specification, we substitute β2 
and β3 in the Basu model (equation 5), to obtain equation (7) below. The firm-year measure of 
conservatism or incremental bad news timeliness CONS (denoted C_Score in Khan and Watts 
2009), varies across firms through cross-sectional variation in the firm-year characteristics (Size, 
MB and Lev), and over time through inter-temporal variation in λi+t and the firm-year 
characteristics. Conservatism is increasing in CONS. Following Khan and Watts (2009), the 
annual cross-sectional regression model used to estimate CONS is as follows:  
Earni = β0 + β1 Negi + Reti (η1 + η2 Sizei + η3 MBi + η4 Levi)  
+ Reti*Negi (λ1 + λ2 Sizei + λ3 MBi + λ4 Levi) + δ1 Sizei + δ2 MBi + δ3 Levi  
+ δ4 Sizei*Negi + δ5 MBi*Negi + δ6 Levi*Negi + µ t            (7) 
Model (7) results from substitution of (6a) and (6b) into model (5), following Khan and Watts 
(2009), we include additional interaction terms between returns and firm characteristics to 
control for the firm characteristics separately (the main effects). 
Given that there is some controversy in the literature on the validity of firm-year 
estimates of conditional conservatism (Givoly et al., 2007) we validate our measure following 
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the approach in Khan and Watts (2009). To do so, we examine whether the empirical properties 
of CONS are consistent with predictions of conservatism and with associations documented in 
prior literature. To do so, we rank firms annually into 10 portfolios according to CONS. Then, 
we examine three sets of properties. First, we estimate the standard Basu (1997) regression on 
the pooled (cross-sectional and time-series) data within each CONS decile, and examine whether 
the Basu incremental timeliness coefficients (β3) from these regressions increase monotonically 
across the CONS deciles.  
Second, we examine whether the information asymmetry is associated to CONS. Watts 
(2003) and Khan and Watts (2009) argue that conservatism is a means of addressing agency 
problems stemming from information asymmetries between parties. We use the bid-ask spread 
(BAS) and the PIN metric of Easley et al. (2002) to proxy for information asymmetry. We expect 
CONS is positively associated to PIN and BAS. Lastly, we look at the association between 
CONS and firm age (Age) and the length of the investment cycle (Inv.Cyc). Khan and Watts 
(2009) argue that conservatism is decreasing in firm age, because younger firms tend to have 
more growth options relative to assets-in-place than older firms. Information asymmetry 
increases with growth options because future cash flows from growth options are normally 
unverifiable, increasing agency costs and thus leading to more conservatism. Regarding Inv.Cyc, 
Khan and Watts (2009) argue that conservatism is positively associated to investment cycle 
length, because length captures investment uncertainty. These authors hypothesize that firms 
with longer investment cycles have future gains that are less verifiable ex ante, are more likely to 
face adverse outcomes from investments (the longer the cycle the more difficult it is to forecast 
the magnitude and timing of future cash flows), and have higher potential shareholder losses, 
thus increasing the likelihood of litigation and the demand for conservative accounting. 
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Following Khan and Watts (2009), as an additional measure of information asymmetry and 
investment uncertainty, we also look at the association between conservatism and idiosyncratic 
volatility (Volatility) measured as the standard deviation of one year of daily stock returns.   
Table 1 Panel A shows the results from these tests. The Basu asymmetric timeliness for 
the high and low CONS deciles (diff= 0.123) is significantly positive at conventional levels. The 
β3 coefficients exhibit a clear ascending trend as we move up the conservatism portfolio ranks. 
The β3 coefficient monotonically increases with CONS (from portfolio 1, β3 = 0.121; to portfolio 
10, β3 = 0.243). Table 1 Panel A also shows that information asymmetry as measured by both 
PIN and BAS is significantly increasing in CONS, and the highest CONS decile has significantly 
higher information asymmetry than the lowest CONS decile, as predicted and consistent with the 
results in Khan and Watts (2009). Table 1 Panel A also shows that Size is decreasing and Lev is 
increasing in CONS as expected. Finally, consistent with the results in Khan and Watts (2009), 
we show that CONS is decreasing in Age and the InvCycle, and increasing in Volatility (a proxy 
of investment uncertainty). Overall, the association between CONS and various firm 
characteristics is consistent with CONS correctly measuring conservatism. 
Table 1 Panel B presents descriptive evidence of our conditional conservatism proxy 
CONS. The descriptive evidence of CONS is very similar to the values reported in Khan and 
Watts (2009). In particular, the mean (median) value of CONS in our sample is of 0.11 (0.10), 
and of 0.105 (0.097) in Table 4 of Khan and Watts (2009: 138). Similar to the results that Biddle 
et al. (2009) report for their earnings quality measures we find that AQ is negatively correlated 
with Investmentt+1, and that our proxy CONS is also negatively correlated with Investmentt+1 
(corr = -0.11, p-value <0.01). However, as we show below, the relation between CONS and 
Investment is conditional on firm propensity to over- or under-invest. The correlation between 
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CONS and the Biddle et al. (2009) measure of accruals quality (AQ) is significantly negative, 
although quite low (corr = -0.14, p-value <0.01). This indicates that CONS and AQ do not proxy 
for the same earnings attributes. This is as expected since AQ is a measure of the volatility in the 
time-series association between firm current accruals and prior, current and future cash flows, 
obtained from the firm-level residuals from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model during years t-
5 to t-1. Conservative accounting increases the probability that accruals and cash flows do not 
perfectly match into each other, and that varying lags appear in the firm-level time-series 
mapping of cash flows into accruals.   
3.5. The sample 
We use COMPUSTAT to extract accounting data and CRSP to extract stock market data. To 
increase the power of our tests, we employ as many observations as possible from the available 
data sources. Our sample period covers 18 years, t = 1990 to 2007. Financial firms are excluded 
because of the different nature of their accrual accounting process and nature of investment. To 
mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized annually at the 1 and 99 
percentiles. The resulting sample consists of 41,851 firm-year observations with data available to 
run the main tests. Table 1 Panel B presents descriptive statistics of main variables. The mean 
(median) investment across all firm-years is 12.81% (9.31%) of prior years’ property, plant and 
equipment. The mean (median) AQ is -0.05 (-0.04) and the equivalent statistics of AQW are 1.20 
(1.13). These figures are consistent with the evidence reported in Biddle et al. (2009). Control 
variables are also consistent with prior research and behave as expected. For completeness, Table 
1 Panel C presents Pearson correlations among the variables.   
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4. Results 
4.1. Conservatism and investment efficiency 
As a first analysis, we study the association between conditional conservatism and investment 
efficiency in situations where firms deviate from the optimal level of investment. Table 2 reports 
the results of running model (1) using the three different proxies of firm incentives to over-
invest. All regressions are estimated in a panel-data fashion with a fixed-effects model that 
includes firm and year indicator variables. Reported t-statistics are based on robust standard 
errors adjusted using a cluster at the firm level.  
Table 2 Panel A presents results based on the time-series aggregate measure (OverInv = 
OverAggregate). We find evidence that conservatism is positively associated with investment in 
years with low aggregate-economy investment (i.e, OverInv = 0 or close to 0). The coefficient on 
CONS is positive and significant (CONS = 13.40, t-stat = 5.25), supporting the prediction that 
conservatism increases investment among firms that are under-investing. The main coefficient of 
interest is the interaction between conditional conservatism and over-investment in years when 
there are signs of over-investment in the economy (i.e, OverInv = 1 or close to 1). The 
coefficient on CONS*OverInv is significantly negative (CONS*OverInv = -18.71, t-stat = -
5.63), which is consistent with conditional conservatism reducing investment in years when 
over-investment is more likely. Interestingly, we do not find evidence that AQ significantly 
reduces either under- or over- investment. This is likely due to the inclusion of additional control 
variables in the model with respect to the specification in Biddle et al. (2009). 
Table 2 Panel B provides results using the cross-sectional industry-level approach to 
proxy for over-investment (OverInv = OverIndustry). As expected, the coefficient on OverInv is 
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significantly positive (OverInv = 5.21, t-stat = 9.38). This confirms that firms classified as being 
likely to over-invest have higher Investmentt+1. The coefficient associated with conservatism, 
CONS, is also positive and significant (CONS = 2.58, t-stat = 2.85), which is consistent with 
conservatism increasing investment in firms operating in under-investing industries. The 
coefficient on the interaction between conservatism and investment, CONS*OverInv, is 
significantly negative (CONS*OverInv = -5.79, t-stat = -4.16), as before, providing additional 
support for the prediction that conditional conservatism limits over-investment. Therefore, the 
results at the industry level are consistent with those obtained at the aggregate level and provide 
support for the hypothesis that conservatism improves investment efficiency both by mitigating 
over- and under-investment. We again do not find evidence of an association between AQ and 
investment efficiency in the industry-level tests. 
Finally, we examine the association between conservatism and investment efficiency at 
the firm-level. Table 2 Panel C provides results using the cross-sectional firm-level approach to 
proxy for over-investment (OverInv = OverFirm). Similar to the results of Panel B, the 
coefficient on OverInv is significantly positive (OverInv = 23.62, t-stat = 50.96). This confirms 
that OverInv is a good proxy of firm-specific incentives to over-invest. As before, the coefficient 
associated with conservatism, CONS, is also positive and significant (CONS = 4.73, t-stat = 
8.63), which is consistent with conservatism increasing investment in firms facing incentives to 
under-invest. The coefficient on the interaction between conservatism and investment, 
CONS*OverInv, is significantly negative (CONS*OverInv = -11.76, t-stat = -9.47), as before, 
providing additional support for the prediction that conditional conservatism limits over-
investment. In this case, we also find evidence of the expected association between AQ and 
investment efficiency. In particular, consistent with the evidence in Biddle et al. (2009), we find 
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that AQ is associated both to lower under-investment (AQ = 22.02, t-stat = 8.57) and lower over-
investment (AQ*OverInv = -40.22, t-stat = -8.34). This confirms that AQ and CONS capture 
different earnings attributes, and highlights the fact that conservatism, as a separate earnings 
attribute, is positively associated to investment efficiency. The results at the aggregate, industry 
and firm-level are internally consistent and support the hypothesis that conservatism improves 
investment efficiency both by mitigating over- and under-investment.  
4.2. Optimal level of investment 
As an additional test of the association between conditional conservatism and investment 
efficiency, we analyse whether conservatism impacts firm likelihood of deviating from the 
optimal level of investment. To do so, we create a variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm-
specific residual from the Investment regression (model 2) is in the top or bottom quintile of the 
distribution (firm-observations that are over- or under-investing relative to their optimal level of 
investment), and the value of 0 if the residual is in the middle three quintiles (benchmark firms, 
near their optimal investment levels). Using this variable, we estimate model (3), a multinomial 
logit pooled regression that tests the likelihood that a firm is in the extreme (under or over) 
investment quintiles as a function of firm conservatism. Table 3 reports results of this test. In 
Panel A, the coefficient on CONS is significantly negative (CONS =-0.30, t-stat= -1.98), 
suggesting that more conservative firms are less likely to under-invest. In Panel B, we also find a 
negative and significant CONS coefficient (CONS =-0.91, t-stat= -5.11). This evidence supports 
the notion that conservative firms are generally less likely to be in either extreme, i.e., they are 
less likely to deviate from optimal investment both by over- or under-investing. Regarding AQ, 
we only find evidence that accrual quality is associated to lower under-investment. There is no 
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evidence that AQ is associated to lower over-investment. This result reinforces the previous 
finding that CONS measures different accounting attributes than AQ.   
As a sensitivity check, we repeat the analysis shown in Table 2 using as dependent 
variable future Capex instead of future Investment. Using this alternative measure of investment, 
we modify model (2) as follows: 
Capext+1 = αi + βi + δ1 CONSt + δ2 CONSt*OverInvt+1+ γ Controlst + µ t+1         (8) 
 
where Capex is a more restrictive measure of investment, calculated as capital expenditure scaled 
by lagged property, plant and equipment. All other variables are calculated as before. Table 4 
Panels A to C present the output from running this model for the full sample in a panel-data 
fashion with a fixed effects model that includes firm- and year- indicator variables. The results 
provide strong evidence in favor of the previous findings. If anything, the results are actually 
stronger in this alternative specification. We find evidence that conservative firms are less likely 
to both under- and over- invest. In particular we find that CONS is significantly positive in all 
Panels, and the interaction term CONS*OverInv is significantly negative across all Panels. Using 
this alternative measure of investment, we also find evidence consistent with AQ increasing 
investment efficiency, in particular, with AQ being associated to lower overinvestment 
(AQ*OverInv is significantly negative across all partitions), consistent with the results in Biddle 
et al. (2009).  
It is expected that more conservative firms are capable of rising additional funding to 
finance their investments at a lower cost, compared to firms with more aggressive reporting 
policies and lower quality accounting and disclosure. Thus, we expect to see that, in the presence 
of high leverage, conservative firms are less likely to under-invest, as they may be capable of 
 29
obtaining additional funding at a lower cost. Conservatism is also expected to limit over-
investment in firms that are cash rich, or particularly, in firms that have greater free cash flow. 
Thus, it is predicted that within the set of firms that face no financing constraints, more 
conservative firms will be less likely to over-invest. As a sensitivity test, we repeat the analyses 
in model (2), using an alternative proxy for incentives to over-invest: the presence of free cash-
flow and capital structure problems. Since the seminal work of Jensen (1986) it is widely 
acknowledge that firms with high free cash flow are more prone to sub-optimal investment. To 
do so, we create a ranked variable (HighFCF) based on the average of two ranked decile 
measures of free cash flow and leverage (the latter one multiplied by one). Free cash flow is 
defined as the three-year average of cash flow from operations minus cash dividends paid for 
both common and preferred stock, scaled by average total assets. Leverage is defined as before. 
Similar to our previous proxies of incentives to over-invest, HighFCF takes values from 0 to 1; 
values closer to 1 (0) indicate settings in which the firm has incentives to over- (under) invest 
Table 5 Panels A and B reports results of running model (2) using HighFCF as our proxy 
of OverInv. Reported results are based on pooled regressions in a panel-data fashion with a fixed 
effects model that includes firm- and year- indicator variables. To enhance the comparability of 
our results with those in Biddle et al. (2009), we report results for this model using as accruals 
quality first AQ (Panel A) and then, AQW (Panel B). Consistent with our predictions, the 
coefficient on CONS is positive and significant across both partitions. This indicates that among 
firms that have low free-cash flows and high leverage (Partition = 0), and thus likely to under-
invest, conservatism increases investment. Regarding the interaction between conservatism and 
the partition variable (CONS*HighFCF), the coefficients are negative and significant across both 
specifications. This evidence suggests that among firms that do not face liquidity constraints 
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(i.e., high free cash-flow firms and with low leverage) conservative firms are less likely to over-
invest. Using this alternative definition of incentives to over- (under-) invest, we do not find 
evidence that accruals quality (either AQ or AQW) reduces over- or under- investment.  
Overall, these findings are consistent with those reported in Tables 2 and 3 and confirm 
the expected positive association between conservatism and investment efficiency.  
4.3. Association between conservatism and future outcomes of investment policies 
The findings of the previous test indicate that higher conservatism tends to reduce investment. If 
this is the case, conservative firms will undertake fewer projects but with higher profitability 
because among the set of possible projects, firms will choose first those with higher NPV and 
reject all negative NPV projects. As a final test, we analyze whether firms that commit to more 
conservative accounting policies increase future profitability thanks to improvements in 
investment efficiency. To the extent that conservatism results in improvements to investment 
efficiency (and thus, in improvements in project selection) we should observe increased future 
performance of the undertaken investments. To test this prediction, we regress measures of 
future performance on our proxy of firm conservatism and control variables. We use two proxies 
of future investment performance measured for the period t+1 to t+3: one proxy is accounting-
based (gross profit margin) and the other is market-based (annual stock return). Because 
conservative accounting policies affect future earnings, we need to be careful in selecting our 
profitability measure. Measures such as ROA are mechanically related to conservatism in prior 
periods. We use gross profit margin as a measure of profitability that is less likely to be affected 
by prior periods conservatism.  
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Table 6 Panels A to D report results of estimating model (4). The sample size is reduced 
given that we require additional data to estimate future performance. We can observe that our 
proxy of commitment to conditional conservatism is positively associated to both the three year 
average stock return and to the three-year average gross profit margin (Panel A, CONS = 0.10, t-
stat = 2.44; Panel B, CONS = 0.05, t-stat = 2.21; Panel C, CONS = 0.10, t-stat = 2.44; Panel C, 
CONS = 0.05, t-stat = 2.19). Thus, the results from this final test are consistent with prior 
evidence reported in the paper and provide corroborative evidence in support of our prediction of 
a positive association between conservatism and investment efficiency. Again in this test, we do 
not find evidence of an association between accruals quality and future performance, once we 
incorporate CONS to the model.  
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
Accounting conservatism, through the timelier recognition of losses in the income statement, is 
expected to increase firm investment efficiency through three main channels: (1) by decreasing 
the adverse effects of information asymmetries and facilitating the monitoring of investment 
decisions; (2) by increasing managerial incentives to abandon poorly performing projects earlier 
and undertake fewer negative net present-value investments; and (3) by facilitating access to 
external financing at lower cost. Using a large US sample for the period 1990-2007, we find a 
negative association conditional conservatism and measures of over- and under-investment. Our 
results suggest that conservatism improves investment efficiency in firms facing financing 
constraints, reducing under-investment, and also among firms with high free cash flows and low 
leveraged firms, reducing over-investment. We also show that more conservative firms tend to 
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invest less and outperform other firms in terms of future investment performance. This is 
consistent with firms reporting more conservative numbers investing more efficiently.  
Our results add to the recent stream of empirical literature on the effects of higher quality 
reporting over investment efficiency (Verdi, 2006; Biddle and Hilary, 2006, McNichols and 
Stubben, 2008; Hope and Thomas, 2008; Biddle et al., 2009), and particularly, on whether 
conservatism impacts managerial investment decisions (Bushman et al., 2007, Ahmed and 
Duellman, 2007a). They also add to a growing stream of literature (Guay and Verrecchia, 2007; 
LaFond and Watts, 2008; Suijs, 2008) suggesting that eliminating conservatism from accounting 
regulatory frameworks is likely to lead to undesirable economic consequences. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 
Panel A: Validation of the conservatism measure: C-Score 
 
C-Score 
decile C-Score Size MTB Leverage InvCycle BAS PIN Volatility Age β3 
1 -0.037 8.750 4.961 0.250 0.053 0.029 0.134 0.023 25.960 0.121 
2 0.024 7.653 3.507 0.277 0.053 0.031 0.151 0.024 23.290 0.130 
3 0.055 6.887 3.108 0.285 0.054 0.034 0.168 0.027 19.645 0.141 
4 0.079 6.261 2.854 0.282 0.053 0.037 0.184 0.029 17.464 0.146 
5 0.100 5.733 2.536 0.312 0.053 0.039 0.197 0.031 16.978 0.157 
6 0.120 5.206 2.384 0.313 0.051 0.042 0.215 0.033 15.812 0.171 
7 0.140 4.727 2.183 0.350 0.051 0.045 0.228 0.036 15.018 0.180 
8 0.164 4.179 2.019 0.395 0.051 0.048 0.250 0.039 14.690 0.210 
9 0.193 3.587 1.920 0.493 0.051 0.054 0.265 0.044 14.685 0.214 
10 0.254 3.079 1.723 1.165 0.050 0.059 0.279 0.048 14.877 0.243 
Pearson 
correl. 0.99 -0.99 -0.91 0.70 -0.90 0.99 1.00 0.98 -0.90 0.98 
Predicted 
sign + – – + – + + + – + 
Diff. 
Hi-Lo 0.291
c 
-5.671c -3.238c 0.915c -0.004c 0.030c 0.145c 0.025c -11.084c 0.123c 
The table shows the means of selected characteristics of C-Score deciles. The sample contains 41,851 firm-year 
observations for the period 1990-2007. Firms are sorted annually into deciles of C-Score, and the mean of selected 
variables is reported for each decile. C-Score is the firm-year measure of accounting conservatism constructed by 
Khan and Watts (2009). Higher values of C-Score are associated with higher conservatism. Unless otherwise 
indicated, the following variables are measured at fiscal year end. Size is the log of market value of equity. MTB is 
the market-to-book value of equity ratio. Leverage equals short-term plus long-term debt scaled by market value of 
equity. InvCycle is a decreasing measure of the length of the investment cycle defined as depreciation expense 
scaled by lagged total assets. BAS and PIN are measures of asymmetric information. BAS is the bid-ask-spread 
defined as the annual average of daily spread scaled by the midpoint between bid and ask. PIN is the probability of 
an informed trade developed by Easley et al. (2002); it is only available for the period 1983-2001. Volatility is the 
standard deviation of one year of daily stock returns. Age is the age of the firm in a given year, measured as the 
number of years with return history in CRSP. β3 is the asymmetric timeliness coefficient in a Basu (1997) regression 
pooling all firm-year observations in the same C-Score decile. The Pearson correlation denotes the correlation 
between the decile ranks of C-Score and the decile means of each firm characteristics; it is a measure of the 
monotonicity of the C-Score rankings in the table. Diff. Hi-Lo indicates the difference between the values of each 
variable for the top and bottom deciles of C-Score. The ‘c’ superscript indicates two-tailed statistical significance at 
less than 1% 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Panel B: Univariate statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. p10 p25 Median p75 p90 
Investment t+1 (%) 12.81 11.93 2.17 4.79 9.31 16.93 27.57 
CONS 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.22 
AQ -0.05 0.04 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 
AQW 1.20 0.42 0.80 0.97 1.13 1.34 1.67 
Inst-holdings 0.35 0.30 0.00 0.05 0.32 0.60 0.78 
Analysts 4.38 6.37 0.00 0.00 2.00 6.00 13.00 
InvG-Score -3.40 4.74 -11.00 -8.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
G-Score-dum 0.63 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
BAS 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 
Volatility 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Size 5.59 2.03 2.98 4.05 5.47 7.02 8.37 
MTB 2.72 2.61 0.84 1.26 1.92 3.17 5.31 
Leverage 0.42 0.69 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.52 1.07 
AcceDep 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
StdCFO 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.19 
StdSales 0.21 0.21 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.26 0.45 
StdInvestment 7.31 7.30 1.30 2.50 4.87 9.41 16.48 
Z-Score 1.43 1.15 0.29 0.80 1.43 2.07 2.76 
Tangibility 0.31 0.24 0.06 0.12 0.25 0.46 0.70 
Ind-Cap-Struc 0.19 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.16 0.26 0.37 
CFOsale -0.01 0.64 -0.09 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.23 
Dividend 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Age 17.83 14.74 4.84 7.26 12.76 23.94 35.44 
OperCycle 4.69 0.70 3.86 4.31 4.76 5.15 5.50 
InvCycle 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.09 
Loss 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Slack 2.11 5.88 0.02 0.06 0.28 1.40 5.19 
The sample contains 41,851 firm-year observations for the period 1990-2007. Investment is a measure of total 
investment calculated as capital expenditures plus research and development plus acquisition expenditures less cash 
receipts from sales of PPE, multiplied by 100 and scaled by average total assets. CONS is the Kahn and Watts 
(2009) firm-year measure of accounting conservatism. Higher values of CONS are associated to higher 
conservatism. Size is the log of market value of equity. AQ is the measure of accruals quality developed by Dechow 
and Dichew (2002) and modified by Francis et al. (2005). AQW is the measure of accruals quality developed by 
Wysocki (2008) and modified by Biddle et al. (2009). Higher values of AQ and AQW indicate higher accruals 
quality. Inst-holdings is the percentage of firm shares held by institutional investors. Analysts is the number of 
analysts following the firm. InvG-Score is is the measure of anti-takeover protection developed by Gompers et al. 
(2003), multiplied by negative one. When G-Score is missing, InvG-Score is assigned the value of zero. G-Score-
dum is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if G-Score is missing, and zero otherwise. BAS is the bid-
ask-spread defined as the annual average of daily spread scaled by the midpoint between bid and ask. Volatility is 
the standard deviation of one year of daily stock returns. Size is the log of market value of equity. MTB is the 
market-to-book value of equity ratio. Leverage equals short-term plus long-term debt scaled by market value of 
equity. AccDep is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm uses accelerated depreciation, and zero otherwise. 
StdCFO is the firm-specific standard deviation of the cash flow from operations scaled by average total assets, for 
years t-5 to t-1. StdSales is the firm-specific standard deviation of annual sales deflated by average total assets, for 
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years t-5 to t-1. StdInvestment is the firm-specific standard deviation of annual Investment for years t-5 to t-1. Z-
Score is a measure of bankruptcy risk. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets. Ind-
Cap-Struc is the mean of capital structure for firms in the same SIC-3 digit industry, where capital structure is the 
ratio of long-term debt to the sum of long-term debt and market value of equity. CFOsale is the ratio of CFO to 
sales. Dividend is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm paid dividend; zero otherwise. Age is the 
difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year. OperCycle is the log of 
receivables to sales plus inventory to COGS multiplied by 360. InvCycle is a decreasing measure of the length of the 
investment cycle defined as depreciation expense scaled by lagged total assets. Loss is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if net income before extraordinary items is negative; zero otherwise. Slack is the ratio of cash to 
property, plant and equipment. 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Panel C: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25)
(1) Investmt+1 (%) 1.00
(2) CONS -0.11 1.00
(3) AQ -0.12 -0.14 1.00
(4) Inst-holdings 0.01 -0.20 0.17 1.00
(5) Analysts 0.04 -0.39 0.20 0.55 1.00
(6) InvG-Score 0.09 0.30 -0.26 -0.43 -0.48 1.00
(7) G-Score-dum 0.09 0.32 -0.26 -0.45 -0.50 0.94 1.00
(8) BAS 0.14 0.27 -0.39 -0.27 -0.24 0.35 0.34 1.00
(9) Volatility 0.12 0.30 -0.39 -0.30 -0.27 0.38 0.37 0.84 1.00
(10) Size 0.03 -0.58 0.31 0.44 0.60 -0.54 -0.56 -0.50 -0.52 1.00
(11) MTB 0.26 -0.31 -0.18 0.04 0.14 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 0.07 0.24 1.00
(12) Leverage -0.23 0.30 0.13 -0.10 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.12 -0.24 1.00
(13) AcceDep 0.02 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 1.00
(14) StdCFO 0.17 0.11 -0.62 -0.15 -0.16 0.25 0.24 0.38 0.37 -0.25 0.21 -0.12 -0.05 1.00
(15) StdSales 0.00 0.12 -0.36 -0.12 -0.13 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.28 -0.24 0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.37 1.00
(16) StdInvestment 0.20 0.08 -0.18 -0.01 -0.04 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.18 -0.06 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.32 0.16 1.00
(17) Z-Score -0.22 -0.05 0.09 0.11 0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.20 -0.18 -0.02 -0.12 -0.07 -0.02 -0.22 0.17 -0.25 1.00
(18) Tangibility -0.01 -0.06 0.37 -0.04 0.11 -0.14 -0.14 -0.27 -0.26 0.18 -0.14 0.25 0.17 -0.31 -0.25 0.00 -0.11 1.00
(19) Ind-Cap-Struc -0.26 0.04 0.32 -0.04 0.04 -0.18 -0.17 -0.27 -0.26 0.12 -0.25 0.44 0.03 -0.28 -0.14 -0.08 0.02 0.57 1.00
(20) CFOsale -0.21 -0.05 0.15 0.08 0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.20 -0.19 0.11 -0.16 0.05 0.06 -0.24 -0.04 -0.13 0.40 0.17 0.15 1.00
(21) Dividend -0.17 -0.23 0.34 0.08 0.18 -0.35 -0.32 -0.47 -0.47 0.36 -0.08 0.06 0.10 -0.33 -0.24 -0.19 0.14 0.30 0.33 0.15 1.00
(22) Age -0.16 -0.16 0.25 0.16 0.24 -0.48 -0.43 -0.36 -0.36 0.32 -0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.26 -0.24 -0.21 0.07 0.19 0.24 0.10 0.41 1.00
(23) OperCycle -0.01 0.00 -0.12 -0.04 -0.06 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.13 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.04 0.06 -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 -0.40 -0.30 -0.06 -0.09 -0.01 1.00
(24) InvCycle 0.24 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.12 0.01 -0.03 0.17 -0.08 0.39 0.04 0.09 -0.05 -0.11 -0.20 1.00
(25) Loss 0.09 0.20 -0.24 -0.16 -0.15 0.16 0.16 0.37 0.37 -0.25 0.07 0.11 -0.03 0.27 0.11 0.16 -0.49 -0.14 -0.15 -0.32 -0.28 -0.17 0.05 0.05 1.00
(26) Slack 0.14 0.02 -0.20 -0.01 -0.05 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.14 -0.07 0.13 -0.18 -0.08 0.28 0.10 0.07 -0.20 -0.36 -0.28 -0.27 -0.19 -0.15 0.02 -0.21 0.15
The sample contains 41,851 firm-year observations for the period 1990-2007. The variables are defined in Panel B of Table 1.  
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Table 2 
Conditional relation between future investment and accounting conservatism 
Settings where the likelihood of overinvestment is high 
Investment 
 t+1 = α i + β t + δ 1 CONS + δ 2 CONS*OverInvest + γ Controls + ε 
 
 
Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
Dependent variable = 
Investment t+1 
OverInvest = 
OverAggregate 
 OverInvest = 
OverIndustry 
 OverInvest = 
OverFirm 
 
  
        
 
 Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat 
  
CONS 13.40 5.25 ***  2.58 2.85 ***  4.73 8.63 *** 
CONS*OverInvest -18.71 -5.63 ***  -5.79 -4.16 ***  -11.76 -9.47 *** 
AQ 7.20 1.32    -4.01 -0.81    22.02 8.57 *** 
AQ*OverInvest 
-6.55 -0.98    9.55 1.43    -40.22 -8.34 *** 
Institutions -2.16 -2.69 ***  -1.48 -2.57 ***  -2.32 -6.01 *** 
Institutions*OverInvest 1.10 1.15    0.19 0.21    2.70 3.64 *** 
Analysts 0.12 3.73 ***  0.01 0.54    -0.03 -1.54   
Analysts*OverInvest 
-0.15 -3.90 ***  -0.01 -0.14    0.05 1.42   
InvG-Score -0.22 -2.83 ***  -0.21 -2.90 ***  -0.29 -6.54 *** 
InvG-Score*OverInvest 0.10 1.99 **  0.12 2.10 **  0.46 10.07 *** 
G-Score-dum 2.48 4.24 ***  2.41 4.12 ***  0.97 2.83 *** 
OverInvest 
- -  
 5.21 9.38 ***  23.62 50.96 *** 
BAS -8.26 -1.52    -7.49 -1.39    -4.52 -1.42   
Volatility -13.60 -2.08 **  -14.85 -2.27 **  0.59 0.16   
Size -0.34 -2.22 **  -0.38 -2.47 **  0.10 1.17   
MTB 0.42 8.95 ***  0.41 8.80 ***  0.16 5.73 *** 
Leverage -3.04 -17.14 ***  -2.98 -16.96 ***  -0.14 -1.58   
AcceDep -0.40 -1.00    -0.43 -1.09    -0.14 -0.69   
StdCFO 3.01 1.93 *  2.91 1.87 *  1.52 1.67 * 
StdSales 
-0.25 -0.61    -0.34 -0.85    0.53 2.14 ** 
StdCapex -0.12 -9.21 ***  -0.12 -9.30 ***  -0.05 -6.09 *** 
Z-Score 0.94 5.55 ***  0.95 5.57 ***  0.17 1.64 * 
Tangibility 1.26 1.12    0.94 0.84    -0.79 -1.23   
Ind-Cap-Struc 
-7.41 -6.36 ***  -6.82 -5.90 ***  -6.74 -9.60 *** 
CFOsale -1.18 -4.74 ***  -1.18 -4.75 ***  -0.35 -1.98 ** 
Dividend 0.12 0.52    0.10 0.43    0.00 0.00   
Age 0.04 1.10    0.04 1.13    0.01 0.63   
OperCycle 
-1.36 -5.14 ***  -1.39 -5.29 ***  -0.38 -2.30 ** 
InvCycle 10.75 2.82 ***  10.79 2.84 ***  11.69 4.87 *** 
Loss -1.08 -6.48 ***  -1.12 -6.73 ***  -0.59 -5.99 *** 
Slack 0.02 0.86    0.02 0.69    0.01 0.59   
 
   
 
   
 
   
Joint significance of δ
 1 + δ 2 <0.001    <0.001    <0.001   
Firm and year fixed effects Yes    Yes    Yes   
Robust std.err. (firm cluster) Yes    Yes    Yes   
R-square (within) 0.08    0.08    0.61   
Obs 41,851    41,851    41,851   
The sample covers the period 1990-2007. Investment is a measure of total investment scaled by average total assets. 
CONS is the Kahn and Watts (2009) firm-year measure of accounting conservatism. Higher values of CONS are 
associated to higher conservatism. AQ is the measure of accruals quality developed by Dechow and Dichew (2002) 
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and modified by Francis et al. (2005). Higher values of AQ indicate higher accruals quality. OverAggregate is a 
ranked variable based on the annual unexplained aggregate investment for all firms in the economy. It takes values 
from 0 to 1; values closer to 0 (1) indicate settings in which under-investment (over-investment) is most likely. 
OverIndustry is a ranked variable based on the unexplained industry-year investment. It takes values from 0 to 1; 
values closer to 0 (1) indicate settings in which under-investment (over-investment) is most likely. OverFirm is a 
ranked variable based on the unexplained firm-year investment. It takes values from 0 to 1; values closer to 0 (1) 
indicate settings in which under-investment (over-investment) is most likely. The rest of control variables are 
defined in Panel B of Table 1. The regressions are estimated in a panel-data fashion with a fixed effects model that 
includes firm and year indicator variables. Reported t statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted using a 
cluster at the firm level. The symbols ***, **, * denote two-sided significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
.
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Table 3 
Accounting conservatism and deviations from expected future investment 
Investment extremes
 t+1 = α i + β t + δ CONS + γ Controls + ε 
 
 
Panel A  Panel B 
Multinomial logit 
regression 
Under-investment  
vs.  
Normal investment 
 Over-investment 
vs.  
Normal investment 
Dependent variable = 
  
    
 
Investment extremes
 t+1 Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   
        
CONS -0.30 -1.98 **  -0.91 -5.11 *** 
AQ -2.72 -4.72 ***  -0.47 -0.84   
Institutions -0.20 -2.13 **  0.15 2.06 ** 
Analysts 0.00 -0.20    0.02 4.16 *** 
InvG-Score 0.03 1.77 *  -0.02 -1.39   
G-Score-dum -0.18 -1.17    0.20 1.82 * 
BAS -1.74 -1.24    2.82 2.18 ** 
Volatility 1.38 0.84    -2.69 -1.64 * 
Size -0.12 -5.89 ***  -0.11 -7.41 *** 
MTB -0.01 -0.56    0.06 8.86 *** 
Leverage 0.24 8.35 ***  -0.86 -12.01 *** 
AcceDep 0.34 5.23 ***  -0.05 -0.97   
StdCFO -1.31 -4.88 ***  -0.09 -0.38   
StdSales 0.34 3.85 ***  -0.17 -1.91 * 
StdCapex 0.01 5.05 ***  0.02 10.71 *** 
Z-Score -0.19 -6.62 ***  -0.18 -8.03 *** 
Tangibility -0.80 -4.76 ***  0.31 2.69 *** 
Ind-Cap-Struc -4.02 -13.62 ***  -1.24 -5.65 *** 
CFOsale 0.28 4.44 ***  -0.15 -5.55 *** 
Dividend 0.03 0.51    -0.22 -4.73 *** 
Age 0.00 0.26    -0.01 -5.53 *** 
OperCycle -0.24 -6.36 ***  -0.19 -6.77 *** 
InvCycle -4.50 -5.14 ***  9.98 16.47 *** 
Loss 0.00 -0.07    -0.21 -4.44 *** 
Slack 0.00 -0.04    0.01 3.95 *** 
        
Robust std.err. (firm cluster) Yes    Yes   
Pseudo R-square 0.09    0.09   
Obs 41,851    41,851   
The sample covers the period 1990-2007. This table presents results from multinomial logit pooled regressions. The 
dependent variable is based on the level of unexplained total investment. Firm-year observations in the bottom 
quintile of unpredicted investment are classified as under-investing, observations in the top quintile are classified as 
over-investing, and observations in the middle three quintiles are classified as the benchmark group (normal 
investment). The multinomial logit model predicts the likelihood that a firm will be in one of the extreme quintiles 
as opposed to the middle quintiles. CONS is the Kahn and Watts (2009) firm-year measure of accounting 
conservatism. Higher values of CONS are associated to higher conservatism. AQ is the measure of accruals quality 
developed by Dechow and Dichew (2002) and modified by Francis et al. (2005). Higher values of AQ indicate 
higher accruals quality. The rest of control variables are defined in Panel B of Table 1. Reported t statistics are based 
on robust standard errors adjusted using a cluster at the firm level. The symbols ***, **, * denote two-sided 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Alternative measure of investment: capital expenditures 
Conditional relation between future capital expenditures and accounting conservatism 
Capex
  t+1 = α i + β t + δ 1 CONS + δ 2 CONS*OverInvest + γ Controls + ε 
 
 
Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
Dependent variable =  
Capex t+1 
OverInvest = 
OverAggregate 
 OverInvest = 
OverIndustry 
 OverInvest = 
OverFirm 
 
  
        
 
 Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat 
  
CONS 16.97 3.60 ***  13.77 6.52 ***  17.78 11.61 *** 
CONS*OverInvest -24.87 -3.64 ***  -22.16 -6.26 ***  -36.43 -10.42 *** 
AQ 11.84 1.03    27.01 1.89 *  111.35 14.94 *** 
AQ*OverInvest -41.43 -2.72 ***  -56.49 -3.08 ***  -218.81 -17.34 *** 
Institutions -2.82 -2.05 **  -1.34 -1.06    -4.27 -4.30 *** 
Institutions*OverInvest 3.11 1.70 *  0.41 0.20    6.43 3.47 *** 
Analysts -0.11 -1.97 **  -0.19 -4.21 ***  -0.16 -3.50 *** 
Analysts*OverInvest -0.13 -1.97 **  0.02 0.25    -0.01 -0.09  
InvG-Score -0.27 -1.66 *  -0.45 -2.90 ***  -1.01 -8.76 *** 
InvG-Score*OverInvest 0.33 3.86 ***  0.83 7.08 ***  1.97 18.79 *** 
G-Score-dum 5.32 3.75 ***  4.33 3.07 ***  2.31 2.39 ** 
OverInvest - -   10.11 7.24 ***  46.08 37.70 *** 
BAS -22.67 -1.25    -23.90 -1.33    -17.96 -1.63 * 
Volatility 5.83 0.28    0.18 0.01    12.75 0.94  
Size 1.60 4.01 ***  1.40 3.54 ***  1.96 7.57 *** 
MTB 1.68 12.89 ***  1.64 12.71 ***  0.83 9.98 *** 
Leverage -2.90 -8.27 ***  -2.90 -8.54 ***  1.23 5.76 *** 
AcceDep 1.36 1.28    1.30 1.22    0.66 1.15  
StdCFO 2.86 0.59    3.01 0.63    0.22 0.07  
StdSales 1.24 1.02    1.02 0.84    1.29 1.54  
StdCapex -0.03 -4.48 ***  -0.03 -4.58 ***  -0.01 -2.08 ** 
Z-Score 5.53 11.53 ***  5.35 11.16 ***  2.86 9.15 *** 
Tangibility -73.24 -24.03 ***  -72.24 -23.84 ***  -20.94 -11.60 *** 
Ind-Cap-Struc -10.33 -3.57 ***  -8.76 -3.04 ***  -11.44 -6.31 *** 
CFOsale -1.04 -1.44    -0.96 -1.35    -0.06 -0.14  
Dividend -0.86 -1.43    -0.93 -1.55    -0.70 -1.83 * 
Age 0.12 2.71 ***  0.12 2.64 ***  0.03 0.92  
OperCycle 1.47 2.02 **  1.37 1.89 *  0.55 1.16  
InvCycle 13.21 1.21    13.35 1.23    48.60 6.27 *** 
Loss -2.64 -5.83 ***  -2.77 -6.14 ***  -0.95 -3.19 *** 
Slack 1.64 15.52 ***  1.63 15.61 ***  0.82 10.81 *** 
            
Joint significance of δ
 1 + δ 2 <0.009    <0.002    <0.001   
Firm and year fixed effects Yes    Yes    Yes   
Robust std.err. (firm cluster) Yes    Yes    Yes   
R-square (within) 0.19    0.20    0.55   
Obs 41,851    41,851    41,851   
The sample covers the period 1990-2007. Capex is a measure of investment calculated as capital expenditure scaled 
by lagged property, plant and equipment. CONS is the Kahn and Watts (2009) firm-year measure of accounting 
conservatism. Higher values of CONS are associated to higher conservatism. AQ is the measure of accruals quality 
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developed by Dechow and Dichew (2002) and modified by Francis et al. (2005). Higher values of AQ indicate 
higher accruals quality. OverAggregate is a ranked variable based on the unexplained aggregate investment for all 
firms in the economy. It takes values from 0 to 1; values closer to 0 (1) indicate settings in which under-investment 
(over-investment) is most likely. OverIndustry is a ranked variable based on the unexplained industry-year 
investment. It takes values from 0 to 1; values closer to 0 (1) indicate settings in which under-investment (over-
investment) is most likely. OverFirm is a ranked variable based on the unexplained firm-year investment. It takes 
values from 0 to 1; values closer to 0 (1) indicate settings in which under-investment (over-investment) is most 
likely. The rest of control variables are defined in Panel B of Table 1. The regressions are estimated in a panel-data 
fashion with a fixed effects model that includes firm and year indicator variables. Reported t statistics are based on 
robust standard errors adjusted using a cluster at the firm level. The symbols ***, **, * denote two-sided 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Conditional relation between future investment and accounting conservatism 
Settings when the firm has incentives to over-invest 
Alternative measures of accounting quality controls 
Investment t+1 = α i + β t + δ 1 CONS + δ 2 CONS* HighFCF + γ Controls + ε 
 
 Panel A   Panel B 
Dependent variable =   AQ: Dechow&Dichev  Dependent variable =   AQW: Wysocki 
Investment
 t+1     Investment t+1    
 Coeff. t-stat    Coeff. t-stat 
  
CONS 2.40 2.41 **  CONS 2.50 2.52 ** 
CONS*HighFCF -7.77 -3.87 ***  CONS*HighFCF -8.06 -4.02 *** 
AQ -5.85 -0.99    AQW 0.22 0.75   
AQ*HighFCF 15.76 1.67 *  AQW*HighFCF -0.33 -0.56   
Institutions -4.08 -5.16 ***  Institutions -4.17 -5.28 *** 
Institutions*HighFCF 5.30 3.94 ***  Institutions*HighFCF 5.46 4.06 *** 
Analysts 0.04 1.05    Analysts 0.03 0.99   
Analysts*HighFCF -0.06 -1.07    Analysts*HighFCF -0.06 -0.98   
InvG-Score -0.23 -2.99 ***  InvG-Score -0.22 -2.91 *** 
InvG-Score*HighFCF 0.11 1.38    InvG-Score*HighFCF 0.10 1.20   
G-Score-dum 2.50 4.31 ***  G-Score-dum 2.51 4.32 *** 
HighFCF 8.49 9.52 ***  HighFCF 7.92 7.80 *** 
BAS -5.67 -1.05    BAS -5.95 -1.10   
Volatility -13.92 -2.13 **  Volatility -13.78 -2.11 ** 
Size -0.78 -4.94 ***  Size -0.77 -4.92 *** 
MTB 0.41 8.91 ***  MTB 0.41 8.89 *** 
Leverage -2.44 -14.29 ***  Leverage -2.46 -14.47 *** 
AcceDep -0.41 -1.04    AcceDep -0.41 -1.04   
StdCFO 2.94 1.89 *  StdCFO 2.52 1.74 * 
StdSales -0.17 -0.41    StdSales -0.17 -0.42   
StdInvesment -0.10 -8.02 ***  StdInvesment -0.10 -8.01 *** 
Z-Score 0.41 2.42 **  Z-Score 0.40 2.35 ** 
Tangibility 0.65 0.57    Tangibility 0.67 0.60   
Ind-Cap-Struc -6.29 -5.42 ***  Ind-Cap-Struc -6.32 -5.44 *** 
CFOsale -1.11 -4.51 ***  CFOsale -1.11 -4.52 *** 
Dividend 0.15 0.66    Dividend 0.15 0.66   
Age 0.03 1.01    Age 0.03 0.98   
OperCycle -0.93 -3.49 ***  OperCycle -0.93 -3.48 *** 
InvCycle 8.92 2.39 **  InvCycle 9.05 2.42 ** 
Loss -1.00 -6.05 ***  Loss -0.99 -6.03 *** 
Slack 0.00 0.11    Slack 0.00 0.06   
 
   
 
    
Joint significance of δ
 1 + δ 2 <0.001    Joint significance of δ 1 + δ 2 <0.001   
Firm and year fixed effects Yes    Firm and year fixed effects Yes   
Robust std.err. (firm cluster) Yes    Robust std.err. (firm cluster) Yes   
R-square (within) 0.09    R-square (within) 0.09   
Obs 41,851    Obs 41,851   
The sample covers the period 1990-2007. Investment is a measure of total investment scaled by average total assets. 
CONS is the Kahn and Watts (2009) firm-year measure of accounting conservatism. Higher values of CONS are 
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associated to higher conservatism. AQ is the measure of accruals quality developed by Dechow and Dichew (2002) 
and modified by Francis et al. (2005). Higher values of AQ indicate higher accruals quality. AQW is the measure of 
accruals quality developed by Wysocki (2008) and modified by Biddle et al. (2009). Higher values of AQW indicate 
higher accruals quality. HighFCF is a ranked variable based on the average of two ranked decile measures of free 
cash flow and leverage (the latter multiplied by minus one). HighFCF takes values from 0 to 1; values closer to 1 (0) 
indicate settings in which the firm has incentives to over-invest (under-invest). Free cash flow is defined as the 
three-year average of cash flow from operations minus cash dividends paid for both common and preferred stock, 
scaled by average total assets. The rest of control variables are defined in Panel B of Table 1. The regressions are 
estimated in a panel-data fashion with a fixed effects model that includes firm and year indicator variables. Reported 
t statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted using a cluster at the firm level. The symbols ***, **, * 
denote two-sided significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Association between accounting conservatism and future performance 
Alternative measures of accounting quality controls 
FutPerf (t+1 to t+3) = α
 i + β t + δ CONS + γ Controls + ε 
 
 
Panel A  Panel B  Panel C  Panel D 
 AQ: Dechow & Dichev  AQ: Wysocki 
Dependent 
variable = 
Average future 
returns 
(t+1 to t+3) 
 
Average future gross 
profit margin 
(t+1 to t+3) 
 
Average future 
returns 
(t+1 to t+3) 
 
Average future gross 
profit margin 
(t+1 to t+3) 
 
  
            
 
 Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat 
  
CONS 0.10 2.44 **  0.05 2.21 **  0.10 2.44 **   0.05 2.19 ** 
AQ 0.24 1.06    -0.27 -1.93 *  0.00 -0.09    0.00 0.98   
Institutions 0.04 1.37    0.01 0.61    0.04 1.39    0.01 0.55   
Analysts 0.00 0.01    0.00 1.03    0.00 0.01    0.00 1.01   
InvG-Score -0.01 -1.68 *  0.00 -0.80    -0.01 -1.70 *  0.00 -0.76   
G-Score-dum 0.08 2.49 **  0.00 0.27    0.08 2.49 **  0.00 0.25   
BAS 0.88 1.92 *  0.08 0.42    0.87 1.91 *  0.08 0.47   
Volatility 0.87 1.46    -0.31 -1.40    0.87 1.45    -0.30 -1.39   
Size -0.14 -15.13 ***  0.01 1.33    -0.14 -15.12 ***  0.01 1.15   
MTB -0.01 -3.63 ***  0.00 0.20    -0.01 -3.72 ***  0.00 0.30   
Leverage 0.01 1.10    0.00 -0.03    0.01 1.13    0.00 -0.17   
AcceDep 0.01 0.42    0.01 0.73    0.01 0.43    0.01 0.72   
StdCFO 0.03 0.27    -0.10 -1.16    -0.01 -0.15    -0.06 -0.75   
StdSales 0.01 0.36    0.05 3.83 ***  0.01 0.30    0.05 3.84 *** 
StdCapex 0.00 -0.11    0.00 -1.23    0.00 -0.11    0.00 -1.22   
Z-Score 0.03 2.89 ***  0.00 -0.33    0.03 2.86 ***  0.00 -0.28   
Tangibility -0.10 -1.73 *  0.06 2.33 **  -0.10 -1.71 *  0.06 2.25 ** 
Ind-Cap-Struc 0.15 2.02 **  -0.01 -0.54    0.15 2.04 **  -0.01 -0.58   
CFOsale 0.03 2.22 **  0.11 4.08 ***  0.03 2.22 **  0.11 4.08 *** 
Dividend 0.02 1.34    0.00 -0.39    0.02 1.34    0.00 -0.41   
Age 0.00 -2.12 **  0.00 -1.58    0.00 -2.09 **  0.00 -1.76 * 
OperCycle 0.02 1.10    0.04 2.54 **  0.02 1.12    0.04 2.52 ** 
InvCycle 0.87 3.01 ***  0.03 0.27    0.86 2.98 ***  0.05 0.36   
Loss -0.01 -0.49    0.00 0.26    -0.01 -0.48    0.00 0.21   
Slack 0.00 -1.02    0.00 -1.55    0.00 -1.09    0.00 -1.49   
    
 
  
        
 
Firm-year FE Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Firm cluster Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
R-sq (within) 0.15    0.05    0.15    0.05   
Obs 32,369    32,613    32,369    32,613   
The sample covers the period 1990-2007. FutPerf is a measure of future performance of current investments. FutPerf 
is calculated alternatively as the three-year average of annual stock returns for years t+1 to t+3, or as the three-year 
average of gross profit margin for years t+1 to t+3. CONS is the Kahn and Watts (2009) firm-year measure of 
accounting conservatism. Higher values of CONS are associated to higher conservatism. AQ is the measure of 
accruals quality developed by Dechow and Dichew (2002) and modified by Francis et al. (2005). Higher values of 
AQ indicate higher accruals quality. AQW is the measure of accruals quality developed by Wysocki (2008) and 
modified by Biddle et al. (2009). Higher values of AQW indicate higher accruals quality. The rest of control 
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variables are defined in Panel B of Table 1. The regressions are estimated in a panel-data fashion with a fixed effects 
model that includes firm and year indicator variables. Reported t statistics are based on robust standard errors 
adjusted using a cluster at the firm level. The symbols ***, **, * denote two-sided significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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